












In their attempts to understand how knowledge is gained and organized, philosophers routinely distinguish the a priori from the a posteriori.  This distinction is, of course, fundamental to the divide between empiricists and rationalists, the former insisting that experience is our only source of knowledge and the latter allowing that, in addition to experience, some genuine knowledge is purely conceptual.  By ‘experience,’ empiricists usually have meant what can be learned from the five senses (and perhaps by introspection).  Thus, ‘the sky is now blue’ is a posteriori.  By ‘conceptual,’ rationalists have usually meant some sort of direct intellectual insight not mediated by sensory experience.  Thus, ‘the sky is not blue and red all over’ is a priori.  The subject matter of experiential learning par excellence is nature since, as is often said, it is only the “external” realm that is capable of interacting with the senses causally.  The areas most commonly thought to be subject to purely intellectual or conceptual insight have been logic and mathematics, though the example just given is of a different type and some famous attempts have been made to demonstrate external existence and moral truths a priori.
Plato, who was the first to make something like the a priori/a posteriori distinction systematically, drew it along two dimensions: the kinds of objects one knows and the kinds of evidence they provide together with the associated 
mental attitudes one takes towards those objects.   It is clear enough that he also thought that knowledge a priori (knowledge of forms) is stable, i.e., necessary rather than varying situationally like knowledge derived from sense perception.  Beginning with Leibniz, efforts were directed to making the distinction more rigorous.  The question, which persisted through the middle of the last century, was whether a reliable, purely linguistic criterion could be devised to mark the distinction.  Famously, Kant rejected this linguistic strategy (though he adopted it for the analytic/synthetic distinction).  His main contribution is his insistence that a priori knowledge is indispensable if we are to have any knowledge at all and that a priori propositions may be necessarily true in a way that a posteriori propositions cannot, though it is worth remarking that his conception of the a priori crosses Plato’s line between kinds of objects since both mathematical truths and fundamental knowledge of nature are a priori for Kant.  Moreover, he argued that some of these necessary truths are informative in a way that is similar to non-necessary empirical truths.  The synthetic a priori that forms the core of his system does not comprise the “miserable tautologies” of Leibniz and Hume.  But Frege, and following him Russell and the logical positivists, rejected the synthetic a priori, collapsing the a priori into the analytic, which they thought could be given a purely linguistic criterion, either in terms of meaning or provability.  Goedel demonstrated the inadequacy of the provability criterion and the linguistic reduction withered further under Quine’s skepticism over whether meaning could serve to distinguish the analytic from the synthetic.  Quine left the basic distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori unimpugned directly, though, by his lights, in questionable company.  This spark of innocence gives hope that some non-trivial knowledge may yet turn out to be necessary, at least in a metaphysically internalist way, and Putnam and Kripke have risen to this possibility, offering claims about chemical composition, origins of substances, and standards of measurement as examples.  Recent work by Bonjour, Casullo, Audi and others has once again affirmed the claim that the a priori depends on intellectual insight or self-evidence rather than experience.





One controversy is over what goes where and whether there are any synthetic a priori or analytic a posteriori propositions.  Everyone seems to want to allow a very broad range of empirical knowledge subsisting unperturbed alongside whatever a priori knowledge there is or might be.  But, whichever boxes one thinks have instances, the apriori/a posteriori distinction itself seems and is usually intended in some sense to be exhaustive.  What I want to suggest here is that this assumption may give way in the face of a different set of examples.  
The reason is that both a priori and a posteriori knowledge as conceived so far are essentially passive in nature despite ample evidence that they do not exhaust our options for accounting for relevant cases.​[1]​ What I want to point to is belief and knowledge that is clearly and usually knowingly due to the activity of the knower and therefore does not fit into the simple, tidy scheme of the traditional a priori/a posteriori.  For reasons I hope to make clear, I will call the kinds of belief and knowledge that completes does the traditional scheme, the ‘a positio.’
A rich example will help.  Recently it was reported that NASA’s Opportunity Rover sent back pictures from the surface of Mars of so-called “blueberries,” which result from mineral (hematite) deposition from water.  To begin where there is least controversy, one aspect of the example clearly presents a fact that is knowable only empirically and contingently.  That is the fact that the blueberries were observed.  But now, if we follow Kant and perhaps Kripke, it is by necessity that such blueberries form by mineral deposition from water.  Like oxygen and hydrogen combining in the usual way to form water, it is, as it were, in the nature of such substance to do so.  Propositions about the chemical process resulting in blueberries would be for Kant at least a candidate for the synthetic a priori while for Kripke they might serve as an examples of the analytic a posteriori.  For present purposes, however, the difference doesn’t matter.  What matters here is that there is another aspect of the case that is not yet captured.  That is the fact that the rover was (and still is) on a mission from NASA.  The reason I suggest that this feature is omitted from the resources of the standard analyses is that NASA is neither an object of empirical observation, nor is it an object of strict intellectual intuition.  Again, it seems to me that it is the common assumption of the passivity of knowledge that obscures a proper accouint.  However we divide or mingle these two dimensions, the references to NASA, to NASA’s rovers and to the beliefs and knowledge they produce will escape the net.  We need another dimension in which to situate such reference.
There are countless such examples.  ‘I gave an exam in Phil 101 yesterday.’  ‘If today is Tuesday, it’s not Thursday.’  ‘The Dow rose last year.’  Etc.  Paradigm examples of a posteriori knowledge are those resulting directly from sense experience: this apple is red.  Paradigms of a priori knowledge are purely conceptual: 5+7=12.  These are all examples of passive knowledge.  The example of the knowledge resulting from NASA’s probing of Mars is quite different.  First, there is no natural or necessary entity one could be passive towards that answers to the name or description of NASA.  This is a human construct, an artifact.  Moreover, it is a social artifact of a special kind, an institution.  One cannot know of such things purely passively.  Nor can one know about exams, days of the week or the Dow.  These are mind dependent objects.  Like Peter Pan, they subsist via the Tinker Bell effect: they exist only so long as we believe they exist.  By contrast, the a priori/a posteriori distinction is really only suited to knowledge of mind independent objects.
The principle I am working with is well stated by Robert Audi.  He says, “…one cannot believe a proposition without having all of the concepts that figure essentially in it.  Whereof one cannot understand, thereof one cannot believe.”​[2]​  Moreover, as Plato says, our epistemic attitude towards objects has to be attuned to those objects to be epistemic at all, i.e., we need the appropriate kinds of evidence.  Since social artifacts are fundamentally different, we need to take a different attitude towards them and recognize a different kind of evidence to support meaningful beliefs about them than we do towards natural or conceptual objects.  The knower has to participate in the artifactuality at least to the extent of seeing it as a social product.  This means that his or her attitude is active not passive.  Objects knowable a positio are, like empirical objects, subject to change but, like conceptual objects, they are not empirical.  To understand socially constructed objects like institutions, games, etc., it is necessary to meet experience half way.  These objects need support from both sides.  Artworks are also good examples.  The audience cannot be merely passive in understanding “Stardust” or “The Potato Eaters” or these don’t exist as art at all.  It’s not that we don’t observe institutional activity.  Rather, it’s that we can’t understand it for what it is except by consulting our own concepts, ones we ourselves recognize are not themselves the product of observation but of invention.  The Democratic Party, aside from being disorganized, is not natural, not a part of nature, not something the concept of which can be derived from observation or natural entities alone.  And what goes for other institutions goes for language.  Without the collusion of both speaker and listener, writer and reader, it dissolves into mere noise and scribbles.
I introduce the term ‘a positio’ to qualify the kind of knowledge, belief, proposition, etc., that involves such non-empirical and non-necessary entities that cannot be known passively.  What is characteristic of the a positio is that we ourselves collectively posit what it is about.  Therefore, we cannot look to experience or even to intellectual intuition of necessary natures to substantiate such knowledge.  A different kind of evidence is needed.  Nothing that I can observe about NASA without it being posited as an institution engaged in space research could substantiate the claim that it sent the Opportunity rover to Mars to snap pictures.  By observation of the related activity as if it were a natural course of events, all I could learn would be that such a sequence of events took place.  This would leave out all of what is distinctive in NASA being a branch of the government with authority over various resources, personnel, etc.  And, without knowing that, I cannot know that NASA took pictures of the Martian landscape and without knowing that, I cannot believe or know that NASA’s Opportunity photographed Martian blueberries.  For not only would I have failed to have any accurate descriptive knowledge of NASA, I would have failed even to know into what category the object NASA falls.  I would not even know whether the proposition commits a category mistake.  Perhaps NASA is a force of nature or a supernatural intervention in human history or a monkey in a zoo with a video game.  Of course, there are many things I can straight forwardly observe about NASA and its mission to Mars.  The point is that no matter how many such sensory observations I make, they will not support believing or knowing that NASA—the institution—carried out this mission, that it took snapshots of the blueberries.
Simply asking where NASA is should signal an ambiguous response and alert us to the problem.  On one hand, it seems it is in Houston, Cape Cnaveral, etc., physical locations with physical parts: roads, buildings, populations, etc.  On the other hand, those locations and all their physical parts and inhabitants could exist before or after NASA.  So NASA is not that physical stuff.  Therefore, it is to that extent not an empirical object and cannot be known a posteriori.  Nor is it to be associated with particular persons, for it survives them too.  This is characteristic of institutions.  For such reasons we should count NASA and, I think, institutions generally, as abstract objects.  That is the basic reason why they are not subject to empirical observation and the meanings of propositions in which they figure are not merely a posteriori.  Their features simply outrun the empirical evidence.
But, just as not all aspects of the example can be comprehended experientially, there are, to be sure, aspects of our NASA example that are knowable a priori.  Anyone who comprehends ‘Mars’ will know that it is a planet.  But comprehending the term in this way tells us nothing specific about the planet Mars.  Nor will any rational insight suffice.  Indeed, NASA has to go to all the trouble, risk, and expense to send probes like the Opportunity rover there to photograph the place precisely because no one can know a priori the answers to our questions about it’s geology and possible incubation of life.  Similarly for NASA.  Anyone who comprehends the term ‘NASA’ or ‘National Aeronautics and Space Administration’ will know a priori that it is an institution.  But, aside from the trivial descriptive information the title suggests, that will be about all.  NASA can only be known through its history, its mission (as understood by its creators and members), the historical efforts of those holding various offices to realize it, the reactions of the society in which it is embedded, its growth, influences and perhaps even its demise.
Much of this can be known neither a priori nor a posteriori.  The reason is that NASA is an artifact, a transformation of an ordinary set of physical things according to constructed principles.  The truths grounding institutions are, like a priori principles, self-evident.  But, like a posteriori knowledge, they require experiential realization.  I have called such truths ‘a positio’ to respect the artifactuality of their constituents but also to emphasize that these are essentially mind dependent rather than exclusively external things that could be known passively.
It is worth pausing briefly here to contrast in summary how one goes about confirming beliefs about these three different types of objects.   A priori beliefs seem to require some sort of purely intellectual insight, their objects seem to have to be in some sense self evident (necessary), or they need to be logically derived from such insights by self evident steps.  A posteriori beliefs would seem to require the mediation of the senses (or introspection) and appropriate causal links to the resulting beliefs.  A positio beliefs are neither strictly self-evident (why does the batter have to leave the box after three strikes?) nor are they caused entirely by external objects.  Instead, the meaning of a positio beliefs depends on and their truth is only confirmed only by the character of what is posited.  It is not necessary that the speed be limited on the freeway as it is in nature generally but, once the speed limit is implemented, its necessity is there for the world to see.  If the batter were to get more than three strikes there would be a serious question whether the game was any longer baseball.
 There is a certain irony in the fact that epistemologists making the a priori/a posteriori distinction have generally not taken seriously the need for a semantic and epistemic category for linguistic facts.  But obviously language is institutional in character; it is a mind dependent artifact.  This leads me to suggest that some of the claims made by those hamstrung by the standard distinction should be revised.  How does one know that the standard meter stick in Paris is one meter long?  The question is not about the physical length of anything.  Nor is there anything antecedent to the use of the word to have any rational insight into.  Clearly, being the standard meter is a social fact, not an empirical fact.  There is no empirical property of being one meter long except by the grace of something being posited as the standard meter stick, any more than the earth, apart from the constructions of geographers, has an equator.  But it is not strictly a priori either since the standard meter has to be an empirical object (then kept safe, etc.).  Treated as a positio, the question is not what we observe with either the body’s eyes or the mind’s eye but what we have created or constructed and launched into the world on our terms.​[3]​  And that should in principle be a much easier question to answer, since we are the makers we should be in a position to known what we have made.  To understand an institutional fact like NASA photographed blueberries on Mars or the standard meter stick is one meter long, one has to understand the background institution precisely as an institution.  I would make similar remarks about the characters in a play.  I see Hamlet on stage but he is not to be identified with the actor who merely counts as Hamlet in the context and no degree of rational insight can predict what the playwright or the director will have Hamlet do: writing a play is not predicting the behavior of characters.  The a positio, on the other hand, easily encompasses all three types of cases in so far as they involve institutional artifacts.
Epistemology and its sub-fields, including semantics, is about our reactions to objects.  Some we observe.  Some we anticipate or remember.  Some we like or find repulsive.  Some we create.  Any of these objects may be a source of meaning, belief and knowledge.  The question is what are the appropriate epistemic criteria or standards for understanding each of these kinds of object?  Can they be reduced to just one or two?  Empiricists are epistemic monists in this respect: all that can be known requires sense experience.  Rationalists are epistemic dualists since they would add that some knowledge requires no experience.  I have been suggesting that the a priori and the a posteriori are not enough since they exclude full knowledge of institutional facts for which no sense experience is adequate but which cannot be known without sense experience.  For that I think we need the a positio.  I have not tried to impugn the knowability of objects of a priori or a posteriori knowledge.  Nor have I tried to deny that the a priori and the a posteriori are legitimate categories of propositions or of meaning.  The original distinction was predicated on intuitions of two different kinds of objects (though Plato had in mind four!).  My aim here has been merely to take into epistemic and semantic account another type of object: social artifacts, especially institutions, and the undeersatnding of the social facts that depend on them.
One might respond that the a priori and the a posteriori combined are enough even for knowledge of institutions and other artifacts.  After all, most artifacts are obviously external physical objects subject to observation.  But to see something external as an artifact and certainly as an artifact of a certain kind, one has to collude in its construction in a way that is not necessary in the case of non-artifacts.  I have elsewhere​[4]​ suggested that socially produced objects like these requiring collusion are dependent on what I call “social intentions.”  So let me suggest here that what is characteristic of a positio knowledge is that its genuine object is the social intention.  And these are neither empirical nor knowable a priori.
I’ll end with a revised table of examples:
		Analytic			Synthetic
A priori		bachelors are unmarried	C = pd
A posteriori	water is H2O			the sky is now red
A positio		murder is felonious		NASA photographed blueberries on Mars




^1	  I do not wish to beg any questions against Kant here.  There is a sense in which his a priori knowledge is not passive.  But the activity that produces it is, as it were, unknowable to the actor.
^2	  Robert Audi, The Architecture of Reason, (Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 27.
^3	  In commentary on an earlier version of this paper, Heimir Geirsson has suggested that my characterization of the a positio confuses epistemic and metaphysical concepts.  He says, “It is not the nature of the object of knowledge that determines whether knowledge is a priori or a posteriori—instead it’s the nature of the (possible evidence)…This is a distinction that does not depend on the nature of the objects they are about.” He is concerned particularly with  beliefs about physical objects like the length of the meter stick.  Now the claim that the meter stick is a meter long seems to be a constitutive, socially determined fact.  So the claim is not about some chunk of metal at all, it’s really about a distance abstractly defined.  It has been approximated several times with increasing accuracy and stability, first with a geophysical measurement (one ten millionth of the distance from the equator to north pole, then a representation of that measurement first with an iron bar and later with a platinum/iridium bar, then a certain number of wavelengths of light produced by krypton burned in a (near) vacuum, and finally to the distance light travels in a (near) vacuum in a certain interval of time.  (Note that the meter originally depended on locating the equator and the pole, both of which are idealizations.)  It is typical of belief a positio that, like the a priori, it is necessary but, like the a posterori, it is changeable.  And that is due to the nature of the object of a positio belief.  What else could control the kind of evidence we can have besides the nature of the object—especially in cases where the object is socially constructed?  Nature provides no standard meter—or any other standards or norms—so we invent them and, eo ipso, what counts as evidence about them that can enter into relevant meaning and belief.
^4	  “Social Intentions: Aggregate, Collective, and General,” Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 26, 1 (1996).  This essay gives a brief but general account of social intentions and their crucial role in social obligations.
